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Nondisclosure as a Contract
Remedy: Explaining the
Advance-Notice Puzzle
John T. Addison, University of Hull and University of
South Carolina

John B. Chilton, University of South Carolina
Prior theoretical work predicts an underprovision of advance-notice
contracts stemming from their enforcement costs. In the present
model, it is rather the fundamental inability of workers to alienate
their right to quit taken in conjunction with parameters central to
job separation decisions that jointly determine the mix of notice
and no-notice contracts observed in equilibrium. Not all equilibrium
contracts are efficient, but there is no underprovision of notice. Mandating notice cannot improve on joint value and indeed may reduce
it. Furthermore, although a mandate can be merely redistributive,
there are cases in which it harms all parties.
I. Introduction
Empirical evidence suggests that workers who receive advance notice
of impending job loss have significantly lower jobless duration than their
nonnotified counterparts (for a tabular survey of the literature, see Addison and Portugal [1992]). The shorter spells of unemployment of notified
workers are accounted for almost entirely by job finding during the notice
interval, part of which takes the form of early quits (Ehrenberg and
Jakubson 1989). Such "premature" quits, and other forms of worker exit
behavior, presumably play a part in explaining why notice is not freely
given. Indeed, less than 15% of displaced workers receive formal written
notice (Addison and Blackburn 1994). If notice is so valuable to workers,
[Journal of Labor Economics, 1997, vol. 15, no. 1, pt. 1]

? 1997 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
0734-306X/97/1501-0006$01.50
143

144

Addison/Chilton

the puzzle is why we do not observe more contractual arrangements in
which workers pay for the right to be notified via lower wages.
Previous theoretical work rests on a contractual commitment or enforcement failure attributed to notice contracts (Deere and Wiggins 1988;
Kuhn 1992). In this view, a firm may very well want to guarantee its
workers advance notice, but most firms cannot do so because they lack
the means to enforce that promise. In particular,most firms do not promise notice because their workers foresee that they would (subsequently)
renege to avoid the damage of premature quits. The firm commitmentfailure models thus use the presence of circumstances likely to facilitate
self-enforcement (e.g., a large multiplant firm with a reputation to maintain, or a union which would economize on worker litigation costs) to
predict whether a firm adopts notice. The presumption of these models
is that a government mandate to give notice simply enforces a commitment not to engage in opportunistic behavior that firms are willing but
may be unable to achieve on their own.
In this article, we embrace the reverse case and argue that the commitment problem applies to workers and not firms who can freely choose
to commit to provide advance notice.1 We show that there exist conditions
in which a firm would find a no-notice contract superior to an advancenotice contract and other conditions in which the reverse is true. Our
model thus addresses both the frequency of voluntary notice agreements
and employer opposition to mandated notice. There are three central
results of our analysis. First, where the notice mandate binds, thereby
harming the firm, there exist some circumstances in which the worker
benefits and others where the worker loses. Second, should the mandate
benefit workers, it is never possible for their gains to exceed the losses
incurred by firms. Finally, there are conditions under which a firm voluntarily adopts notice even though there exist alternativeno-notice contracts
with the property that the gains to workers would exceed the loss to the
firm, resulting in an overprovision of notice.
The key to understanding these results is that workers make their quit
decisions without regard to the costs imposed on firms. For the firm,
providing less information is a low-cost means of dealing with this moral

' Although it may explainwhy some firms do not offer advancenotice, our
position is that in many cases the cost of enforcingnotice contractsis not the
overridingissue. Most plantclosuresarenot associatedwith bankruptcyor with
the closureof the firm. For this reasonworkerscan reasonablyanticipatethat
should the firm breaka promiseto give advancenotice it would havesomething
to lose, either in the courts or by way of loss of reputation.Nor is it clear
that there need be much ambiguityabout what constitutesa violation;that is,
noncomplianceshouldbe relativelyeasy for (currentandfuture)participantsand
thirdpartiesto confirm.
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hazard on the part of workers. Take as the comparator the best available
no-notice contract for the firm. Adding notice would increase the quit
rate at the given wage, thereby decreasing the profit of the firm. We can
infer that, because the information has an influence on the quit decision,
the worker gains. To undo the adverse effect that information has on
quits, the firm could of course raise the wage, but this response also yields
lower profits than the original no-notice contract.
Another possibility is to provide notice and cut wages. Suppose that
without this wage cut the gain to workers from notice exceeds the loss
to the firm. The firm would now voluntarily furnish notice because there
must exist a wage cut that would compensate it. If, however, the gain to
workers does not exceed the loss to the firm, we have the conditions
necessary to lead to the adoption of a no-notice contract. Surprisingly,
these conditions are not sufficient. As was noted earlier, there exist cases
in which the firm would still voluntarily offer a notice contract. This
particular result is due to a monopsony effect: giving notice lowers the
supply elasticity of labor retained and may create the incentive for the
firm to trim wages. Perfectly analogous to conventional monopsony analysis, this notice contract is inefficient in the sense that there exist alternative contracts under which the winners could notionally compensate the
losers.
The model is presented in the next section. Contracts yielding efficient
retention are developed in Section III. Equilibrium is the subject of Section IV, leading to an evaluation of the consequences of a mandate in
Section V. Robustness of the results with respect to bargaining power
and contract flexibility is considered in Section VI, while the empirical
content of the model is addressed in Section VII. Section VIII concludes.

II. The Model
There are two players, the firm and the worker. For simplicity, future
cash flows are not discounted, and both the firm and the worker are
assumed to be risk neutral. Players are equally ignorant at the outset,
sharing common knowledge of the structure and parameters of the game
(U, v, p, r, w), defined below. Bargaining is also of the simplest kind. The
firm makes a take-it-or-leave-it contract offer that the worker can either
accept or reject.2Rejection terminates the game, yielding the firm a payoff
of zero and the worker his reservation utility U > 0 where the latter is
taken to be the market value of alternative employment.3

The case in which the workermakesthe offer is consideredin Sec.VI.
A positive opportunitycost for the firm could be easily introduced.In this
case, in addition to its potentialfor distortingquits, mandatednotice can be
shown to lead to an inefficientlylow level of employment.
2
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Immediatelyfollowing acceptanceof its offer, the firmprivatelylearns
whetherit is to be permanent(P) or temporary(T): the state is P with
probabilityp E [0, 1]. The game then enters a 2-period phase of real
activity(eitherin productionwithin the firm or in employmentoutside
it, or in unemployment)after which the game ends. The value of the
worker'smarginalproduct is v > 0 in each period the worker remains
with the firm.
For the worker who has accepteda contract,outside offers paying w
> 0 perperiodarrivejustpriorto the startof eachperiod.The probability
of receivingan outside offer just prior to any period is r E [0, 1]. Any
outside offer that arrivesprior to the first period, a first-periodoutside
offer,is assumedfor simplicityto be for a 2-periodtermof employment.
A second-periodoutsideofferis for 1 periodof employment.The worker
cannot hold on to outside offers. To take an outside offer the worker
must immediatelyquit. Accordingly,the worker'stenurewith the firm
will be 0, 1, or 2 periods.The workeris with the firm for 0 periodsif he
or she quitsat the startof the firstperiod to acceptan outside offer.The
employmentrelationmay end after 1 period either becausethe worker
quits at the startof the second period or becausethe firm is temporary.
The worker'stenureis 2 periodsif the firm is permanentand he or she
does not quit.
With slaveryoutlawed,a contractcan bind a worker to the firm only
by providingthe incentiveto stay. The workerwill simply quit if he has
an outside offer that is more attractivethan staying with the firm. The
incentivesthe firmcanprovidearea set of orderedpairs(x, w). x E {AN,
NN}, whereAN denotesan advance-noticecontractandNN a no-notice
contract.The AN contractis a bindingcommitmentby the firmto inform
the worker immediatelyif the state is T. The worker is informed in
sufficienttime to acceptany outside offer of employment.The term w
is the contractwage, the per-periodwage offeredby the firm as long as
the workerstays with the firm and the plant has not closed. Notice that
any equilibriumcontractmust have the featurethat v - w, the firm's
profit in any period, be nonnegative.Thus, once a contract has been
accepted,the firmwill preferthatit be perceivedto be permanentbecause
this will tend to discourageprematurequits. The assumptionthat the
firm can makebindingcommitmentsto providenotice is not redundant
for preciselythis reason.
Note that contractingcosts do play a role in our explanationfor nonotice contracts.A no-notice contract(at an adequatewage) is a particufor retainingthe workerin all states.As is shown
larlysimplearrangement
in SectionVI, if we allowed for more complexcontingentcontracts,the
quit behaviorundera no-notice contractcould be replicatedat the same
expectedcost by an advance-noticecontract.One such advance-notice
contractwould make the wage contingent on the firm's type, paying
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more when the firm is temporary. Furthermore, any quit behavior obtained under an invariant-wage, advance-notice contract could be purchased at lower cost with a state-contingent wage contract. This latter
possibility would enhance the appeal of advance-notice arrangements to
firms. Because few workers report receiving formal notice of plant closure, however, we are led to conclude that there are transactions costs of
writing and administering these more complex contracts.4 Alternatively,
the firm promising notice could pay a high but noncontingent wage to
bind the worker. But this is more costly to the firm unless it also extracts
an up-front lump-sum payment from the worker. Such arrangementsare
rare. Up-front payments are circumscribed not only by liquidity constraints but also because they attract firms whose sole interest is to take
the money and run.
III. Quit Behavior and Joint-Value-Maximizing Contracts
A. Quit Rules
The equilibrium of the game will be found in conventional backwardinduction fashion. Thus, as a prelude to determining that full equilibrium
in Section IV, we begin with rational quit behavior under any given
contract so as to determine the value of alternative contracts to the firm
and the worker. Note at the outset that second-period quit behavior is
trivial: the worker with an outside offer quits if and only if w < A. (We
shall decide the situation of worker indifference, here and elsewhere, in
favor of staying with the firm.)
Under an NN contract, the worker with a first-period outside offer is
indifferent about quitting when
2

= w + pw +(1-p)ra.

(1)

The value 2w is the payoff to the worker from an outside offer of guaranteed employment for 2 periods at the outside wage a. The expected value
to the worker of staying is w + pw + (1 - p)ro: employment at contract
wage w is assured for the first period, while in the second period the
worker faces the risk of plant closure, which results either in employment
at the lower outside wage (indifference implies w < w) or in unemploy-

Backloadedcompensationmightalso be usedas an alternativeto state-contingent wages. But this createsroom for malfeasance.Imaginea continuous-time
model in which the worker could quit at any time within the notice period.A
workerwho, duringthis interval,quits or is firedfor slackperformancehas the
incentiveto claimthatthe firmfiredhim to avoidpayingseverance.The resulting
ambiguityfor thirdpartiesmakesenforcementcostly.
4
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ment (the value of leisure is zero). Equation (1) defines a critical value of
w, which is convenient to think of as a function of p:
W(p) --[2

-(1

-p)r]

+

(1 + p).

Under a no-notice contract, the worker with a first-period outside offer
will quit if the contract wage w is less than W(p). Evaluation of W(-) at
p = 0 and p = 1 yields critical values under an AN contract when the
firm is, respectively, T or P. For future reference these values are
W(O) =

(2

-

r)

and
W(1)

w

The value W(p) is monotonically decreasing in p, so 0 < W(l) c W(p)
W(O)for 0 -p c 1. Figure 1 illustrates these properties of W(p).
Contracts can be usefully classified into the quit rules they induce.
There are three such categories: given a first-period outside offer, the
worker's quit rule is to (1) always quit, (2) quit only if the firm is type
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Table 1
Expected Value of Contract Type NN
Contract Type

Expected Value

Always quit:
w < W(1)
Always quit (first-period only):
W(1) c w < W(p)

J(NN,
u(NN,
it(NN,
J(NN,
u(NN,
n(NN,

Never quit:
w- W(p)

J(NN,
u(NN,
it(NN,

w)
w)
w)
w)
w)
w)
w)
w)
w)

r2w + (1 - r)[v + rw + (1 -r)pv]
r2w + (1 - r)[w + rw + (1 - r)pw]
rO + (1 - r)[(v - w) + (1 - r)p(v - w)]
r2w + (1 - r)[v + pv + (1-p)rw]
r2w + (1 - r)[w + pw + (1 - p)rw]
rO + (1 - r)[(v - w) + p(v - w)]
v + pv + (1 - p)rw
wz+ pwz+ (1 -p)rw
(v - w)+ p(v - w)

T (which we shall term the contingent-quit rule), or (3) never quit. For
example, referring to figure 1, the contract (AN, w') is a contingent-quit
contract because W(1) c w' < W(O).The worker with a first-period
outside offer would quit if informed that the firm is type T but would
stay if it is of type P. Whether the contract (NN, w') achieves a neverquit or an always-quit allocation depends on p. In figure 1, at p = p",
W(p") > w'. Under the contract (NN, w'), therefore, if p = p", a worker
with a first-period offer would always leave the firm.
The following result is immediate:
LEMMA 1. Self-enforcing contracts. Any (NN, w) contract with w
< W(p) or any (AN, w) contract with w < W(1) is an always-quit contract. Any (AN, w) contract with W(1) c w < W(O)is a contingent-quit
contract. Any (AN, w) contract with w 2 W(O),or (NN, w) contract
with w 2 W(p), is a never-quit contract. Further, if and only if w < W(l),
a second-period offer will result in a quit.
Given these quit rules, the value of alternative contracts can be determined. These values are presented in table 1 for NN contracts and in
table 2 for AN contracts. We use u(x, w) to signify the worker's payoff
over the 2 periods from contract (x, w), while J(x, w) denotes the value
of contract (x, w) to the firm.
B. Joint-Value-Maximizing Contracts
Also included in tables 1 and 2 is the sum of u(x, w) and J(x, w),
namely, the joint value of contract (x, w), denoted by J(x, w). We will
subsequently use the joint-value maximum as a device in solving for
the equilibrium contract offered by the firm. Here we begin that task,
determining which contracts are joint-value maximizing.
The contract (AN, v) gives the worker all the value and all the information. It is therefore joint-value maximizing because the worker would
always take the quit action that enhances joint value. Note the implication:
permitting contracts that dictate the worker's course of action would
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Table 2
ExpectedValue of Contract Type AN
Contract Type
Always quit:
W< W(1)
Contingent quit:
W(1) c w < W(O)
Never quit:
W 2 W(O)

Expected Value
J(AN,
u(AN,
it(AN,
J(AN,
u(AN,
it(AN,
J(AN,
u(AN,
it(AN,

w) = r2w + (1 - r)[v + rw + (1 - r)pv]
w) =r2w + (1 - r)[w + r? + (1 -r)pw]
w) = rO + (1 - r)[(v - w) + (1- r)p(v -w)]
w) p2v + (1 - p)[r2w + (1 - r)(v + rw)]
w) - p2w + (1 - p)[r2w + (1 - r)(w + rw)]
w) p2(v - w) + (1 -p)[rO + (1 - r)(v - w)]
w) =p2v + (1 -p)[v + r] = v + pv + (1 - p)r
w) =p2w + (1 - p)[w + rw] =w + pw + (1 - p)rw
w) p2(v - w) + (1 - p)[v - w] = (v - w) + p(v - w)

create no further improvement in joint value. A corollary to lemma 1
characterizes the entire set of joint-value-maximizing (JVM) contracts:
COROLLARY.
JVM contracts. Always-quit contracts induce JVM
first-period quit behavior if and only if v c W(1). Contingent-quit contracts induce JVM first-period quit behavior if and only if W(1) c v
c W(O).Never-quit contracts induce JVM first-period quit behavior if
and only if W(O)c v. For v c W(1), second-period quit behavior is JVM
if and only if w c W(1). For v 2 W(1), second-period quit behavior
under a contract (x, w) is JVM if and only if w 2 W(1). No other contracts
are JVM with regard to quit behavior.
Proof Lemma 1 can be employed to determine JVM quits. Specifically, take the joint value from any arbitrary sequence of events. The
payoff to the worker from this same sequence of events is the same as
the joint value other than in the replacement of w by v in the worker's
payoff. In contrast to lemma 1, the inequalities are weak because where
there is indifference there is more than one class of JVM contracts. Q.E.D.
Together the corollary and lemma 1 imply that, despite the limitations
on the set of feasible contracts, advance notice is not always necessary to
achieve the joint-value maximum. Specifically, if v 2 W(O),any contract
with w 2 W(O)will achieve the joint-value-maximizing never-quit allocation; if v c W(1), any contract with w c W(1) will achieve the jointvalue-maximizing always-quit allocation.
But might not firms refuse to offer advance-notice contracts when
these are the only means of achieving joint-value maximization? In what
follows, we shall evaluate equilibrium contracts and government mandated notice in terms of the criterion of joint value. We do find that there
exist circumstances in which joint-value maximization is not achieved in
equilibrium, but in each such instance an advance-notice contract (or its
equivalent) is the culprit. It is immediate that a notice mandate can only
reduce joint value.
IV. Equilibrium Contracts
Since by assumption the firm makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer, the
determination of equilibrium contracts reduces to the solution to the
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following optimization problem for the firm:
max it(x, w)

subject to u(x, w)

2

U.

(2)

x,w

The participation constraint, u(x, w) 2 U, indicates that the worker will
not accept a contract unless it is at least as valuable as the best alternative
u. If and only if u(AN, v) 2 u will there exist contracts acceptable to
the worker that yield the firm a nonnegative expected return. We adopt
the convention that if no such contract exists then no contract is offered.
Clearly, the firm and worker agree to a match if and only if it is efficient
for the match to form. However, as we shall see, this does not imply that
equilibrium contracts will necessarily create incentives for joint-valuemaximizing quit behavior.

Lemma 2 shows that certain contracts will never be offered. Note that
these contracts are those found in the middle panel of table 1.
LEMMA2. A contract (NN, w) with W(1) < w < W(p) is never an
equilibrium contract.
Proof. Comparing contracts (NN, w) and (AN, w), where W(1) < w
< W(p), the worker with the (AN, w) contract will avoid the error of
quitting in state P. Thus, the worker strictly prefers the (AN, w) contract.
In equilibrium w c v, so the (AN, w) contract will be preferred by the
firm as well. Q.E.D.
To streamline the presentation, we will concentrate on the special case
in which u equals u(AN, 0) or, equivalently, u(NN, 0).5 The general case
is relegated to the appendix. The firm can narrow its choice of contract
to three alternatives. These are (1) a least-cost always-quit contract, either
(AN, 0) or (NN, 0); (2) the least-cost contingent-quit contract (AN, w);
and (3) the least-cost never-quit contract (NN, W(p)). No other contract
can be a solution to problem (2).
It is convenient to think of the firm as residual claimant, with the
expected cost to the residual claimant of a contract (x, w) equaling the
worker's expected earnings u(x, w). That is, the firm's payoff is just
i(x, w) = J(x, w) - u(x, w). We begin, then, by determining the worker's
ranking of the three relevant alternatives.
The least-cost contingent-quit contract (AN, w) pays a wage matching
the outside wage w, leaving the worker indifferent between staying with
a permanent firm and accepting an outside offer. The worker's earnings
are 2w when the firm is permanent or when the worker receives an outside
offer (in any period). Otherwise-that is, when the firm is temporary

5An alternativeinterpretation
is thatthe participationconstraintis replacedby
the constraintthat the wage be nonnegative.
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and the worker does not find outside employment-the worker earns
only A. Thus, the worker's expected earnings from (AN, w) are less than
2o). It is obvious that u(NN, 0) = u(AN, 0) < u(AN, C)).
The least-cost means of always retaining the worker is to offer a nonotice contract at the wage W(p) that leaves the worker indifferent between staying with the firm, not knowing its type, and accepting an
outside offer. That wage as we have seen exceeds w because, in comparison
to a contingent-quit contract, a never-quit contract must compensate the
worker for the error of staying with a firm that turns out to be temporary.
The worker's indifference implies that his expected value from the leastcost never-quit contract is 2w), namely, the earnings possible from an
outside offer.
To summarize, the worker's rankings are u(NN, W(p)) = 2w)> u(AN,
w) > u(AN, 0) = u(NN, 0). These results can be readily checked directly
by referring to tables 1 and 2.
Turning to the firm's rankings, consider first the case where only a
contingent-quit contract maximizes J. The conventional wisdom suggests that, absent a mandate, most firms will provide too little information to workers with the result that retention rates are higher than
they should be. But will the firm ever choose a never-quit contract,
the contract that would result in fewer quits than is joint-value maximizing? No. The reasoning is straightforward. Compared to the leastcost efficient contract, the size of the pie, J, would be smaller and the
worker is better off-the residual left to the firm would be smaller.
Thus, contrary to the standard view, any departure from joint-value
maximization will be in the direction of creating too many rather than
too few quits. The firm will offer either the least-cost contingent-quit
contract or a least-cost always-quit contract. Recall that the former is
an advance-notice contract and that the provision of notice is irrelevant
in the latter case.
In the case where only a never-quit contract is joint-value maximizing,
the logical possibilities are that the firm provides either a never-quit
contract or a contract that results in quits. The latter contracts shrink the
size of the joint payoff, but since they give the worker less the firm's
residual may actually increase. Note that where the firm offers a neverquit contract, the least-cost contract it offers is a no-notice contract.
The third case is transparent.If an always-quit contract maximizes joint
value, the firm captures all the surplus by offering a least-cost alwaysquit contract.
We can summarize these results as follows:
PROPOSITION 1. Suppose there is no participation constraint. Equilibrium contracts either maximize joint value or create more quits than is
joint-value maximizing. Any equilibrium contract that does not maximize
joint value is (or is equivalent to) an advance-notice contract.
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case of W(1) < v < W(O)

Figure 2 gives a graphical presentation of the proposition for the case
W(1) ? v < W(O)in which, from the corollary, a contingent-quit contract
is necessary to maximize surplus. The three parallel lines are loci along
whichJ = X + u is constant. AlongJcQ the joint value equals that obtained
if the worker follows contingent-quit behavior. The other two loci, JNQ
and JAQ, are defined in similar fashion-each lies below JCQin the case
under consideration. The heavy segments indicate feasible allocations of
X and u.6 To obtain contingent-quit behavior, an advance-notice contract
paying between W(1) and W(O)is required. The heavy segment alongJcQ
thus ends at allocation C, which corresponds to the contract (AN, W(1)).
The worker with a first-period outside offer will quit even in the permanent state if the wage falls below W(1). The resulting allocations belong
to the heavy segment on JAQ. Never-quit behavior can be obtained with
a no-notice contract paying at least W(p). From the result that u(NN,
W(p)) > u(AN, W(1)), allocation N in figure 2 must lie to the northwest
of C: as previously noted, the firm will not offer a contract that causes

6 There are additionalfeasibleoutcomesnot indicated(those from the middle
panel of table 1), but we have alreadyestablishedvia lemma 2 that these are
Pareto-dominated
by other contracts.
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contractswhen W(O)< v

fewer quits than is joint-value maximizing. However, as is illustrated in
the figure, the firm may prefer the least-cost always-quit contract associated with allocation A to its most preferred contingent-quit allocation at
C. The equilibrium allocation is at A. Quits will be excessive. Joint surplus
is not maximized because the increment in J moving from A to C is not
enough to compensate the firm for the increment to u it must pay.
In figure 3 the locus JNQ is farthest out, indicating that never-quit
contracts maximize joint value. Again, point N corresponds to the contract (NN, W(p)), while point C corresponds to the least-cost contingentquit contract (AN, co). In the figure the firm prefers N to C. If only
advance-notice contracts were available to the firm, the least-cost neverquit contract would be (AN, W(O))associated with point N'. If N' is to
the northwest of C, then the firm would choose C. In other words, figure
3 demonstrates that the feasibility of no-notice contracts may make it
attractive for firms to undo the distortion caused by the inability of the
workers to commit to indentured servitude.
Further, the figure also illustrates the potential for monopsony inefficiency. In particular, it is possible that the point corresponding to the
contract (NN, W(p)) is not N, but rather N", which is located to the
northwest of C. In these circumstances, the firm will now select the
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contingent-quit contract (AN, co) rather than choose a joint-value-maximizing contract.
The effect of a participation constraint is to push the firm in the direction of joint-value maximization. For instance, in figure 2 at the reservation utility u' the equilibrium becomes the joint-value-maximizing contract C instead of the contract A. Figure 3 can likewise easily be deployed
to show that a tightening of the participation constraint can convert the
equilibrium from an advance-notice arrangementthat does not maximize
joint value to a no-notice equilibrium that does. The reader interested in
the effect of the participation constraint is referred to the appendix.
V. Mandates
Consider the effects of a government mandate requiring advance notice.
We will compare the pre- and postmandate equilibrium in terms of the
joint value created and its distribution between the firm and the worker.
Note we are not abrogating the notice conditions of an existing contract
but, rather, comparing the equilibrium contracts across alternative
regimes.
A notice mandate simply restricts the opportunity set of the firm in
problem (2). It cannot therefore make the firm better off. Under what
conditions does a notice mandate have an effect on equilibrium? The
notice mandate eliminates from the firm's opportunity set only those
outcomes associated with the no-notice contracts offering w E [W(p),
W(1)). Every other contract either is an advance-notice contract or, because the contract wage is such that information has no value to the
worker, is equivalent to an advance-notice contract.7 All such no-notice
contracts without an advance-notice equivalent are never-quit contracts.
From proposition 1 (and, more generally, proposition Al), never-quit
contracts are used only if they are joint-value maximizing. We therefore
have:
PROPOSITION2. Joint value in the unrestricted equilibrium is greater
than or equal to joint value in the equilibrium under a notice mandate.
Not only is it impossible in this model for all parties to gain from a
notice mandate, it is also impossible for the gains of the winners to exceed
the losses of the losers.
When the mandate constraint is binding, a never-quit contract becomes
less profitable: the wage has to be larger to provide the incentive not to
quit when the firm is temporary. The always-quit and contingent-quit
contract alternativesare unaffected by the mandate. Where the firm never-

Referbackto tables1 and2. The always-quitpanelsareidentical.Contingentquitcontractsareadvance-noticecontracts.Further,the never-quitpanelsoverlap
for w 2 W(p).
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theless continues to favor a never-quit contractual arrangement,the effect
of the mandate is to benefit the worker at the expense of the firm. Joint
value is unaffected. If, however, the firm's preference is changed in favor
of a contingent-quit or always-quit arrangement, joint value declines as
a result of excessive quits. Further, recall that the least-cost never-quit
contract is preferred by the worker to the least-cost always-quit and
contingent-quit contracts. It follows that there are two possibilities if the
notice mandate alters the firm's choice of contracts: either the participation constraint was slack to begin with (i.e., in the premandate equilibrium), in which case the worker's utility is now less than heretofore,8
or the participation constraint was binding, leaving the worker's utility
unchanged. These results are summarized in proposition 3.
PROPOSITION 3. Assume the notice mandate is binding. Never-quit
contracts maximize joint value. The mandate lowers the value of the firm.
The premandate equilibrium contract is a never-quit no-notice contract.
The postmandate equilibrium contract is one of the following: (i) a neverquit contract that the worker prefers, or (ii) an always-quit or contingentquit contract that for the worker is either inferior to or as good as the
premandate equilibrium contract.
Proposition 3 says that if the notice mandate has an effect, it is either
purely redistributive with the gain to the worker equaling the loss to the
firm or it harms the firm and possibly the worker. Figure 3 can be used
to illustrate the latter case. Allocation N is the unrestricted equilibrium
allocation, which achieves joint-value-maximizing never-quit behavior
with the no-notice contract (NN, W(p)). If the firm is constrained to
offer notice, its best never-quit contract is associated with allocation N'.
However, in the situation illustrated, that firm will choose the contingentquit allocation C that is inferior to the unrestricted equilibrium allocation
N for both parties.
Finally, table 3 provides some examples where the notice mandate is
binding and shows that possibilities in proposition 3 are nonempty. The
parametervalues used are p = 0.5, r = 0.6, Co = 2, and v = 3. The
maintainedparametervaluesimply that W(p) = 2.267, W(O)= co(2 - r)
= 2.8, u(AN, W(1)) = 3.84, and u(NN, W(p)) = 2&o= 4. A maximum
joint value of 5.1 is implied. The joint value under a contingent-quit AN
contract is 5.04.
In the table various values of u are considered, just three of which are
amplified here, beginning with u = 3.95. In the absence of a mandate,
the firm would choose a joint-value-maximizing never-quit NN contract:
the value of the firm would be 1.1. We can then infer that the worker
would earn a rent of .05 (that is, 5.1 - 3.95 - 1.1). The largest value of

8

And is the sole outcomefor u = u(NN, 0).
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Table 3
Adoption of Notice Contracts That Are Not Joint-Value Maximizing
(JVM): W(O)c V
Parameter Values: p = 0.5, r = 0.6, o. = W(1) = 2, v = 3
Endogenous Values: W(p) = 2.267, W(0) = o(2 - r) = 2.8,
u(AN, W(1)) = 3.84, u(NN, W(0)) = 2o = 4
LargestValueof Firm:
Under
Contracts
with w < W(1)

u
3.00
3.50
3.95
4.00
4.50
4.75
5.00

1.32-t
.82
.27
.32
0
0
0

Under AN
Contractswith
w 2 W(1)
1.20
1.20 t
1.09t
1.04t
.54t
.29
.04

UnderJVM
Contract
WhenNotice
Is Mandated
.30
.30
.30
.30
.30
.30t
.10:t

Under NN
Contracts
That Are JVM
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.1
.60.35"
.10 -t

withoutnoticemandate.
Equilibrium
contract
contract
withnoticemandate.
t Equilibrium

the firm under an AN contract is 1.09, but this contract is not joint-value
maximizing. Since u = 3.95 > u(AN, W(1)) = 3.84 and this AN contract
does not maximize joint value, we can infer that the worker will just
obtain his reservation utility if notice is mandated. In this case, the mandate harms not only the firm but also the worker.
Next consider u = 4.5. Absent the mandate, the firm would choose a
never-quit NN contract, thereby maximizing joint value: the value of the
firm would be 0.6. From this we can infer that the worker just earns his
reservation utility u (since 5.1 - 4.5 - 0.6 = 0). The largest value of the
firm under an AN contract is .54, but this contract does not maximize
joint value. Given u = 4.5 > u(AN, W(1)) = 3.84, and that joint value
is not maximized, we can infer that where notice is mandated the worker
obtains just his reservation utility. Only the firm is harmed; for the
worker, the wage is reduced by an amount that exactly offsets the value
of notice.

Finally, for u = 4.75, the firm would again choose a joint-value-maximizing never-quit NN contract: the value of the firm would be 0.35.
From this we can infer that the worker would earn no rent (5.1 - 4.75
- 0.35 = 0). The largest value of the firm under a joint-value-maximizing
never-quit AN contract is 0.3. This is also the equilibrium contract under
the mandate. (Having lost NN contracts as a binding mechanism, the
firm substitutes the higher wage never-quit contract (AN, W(0)).) Since
the contract is joint-value maximizing, the worker's utility under this
contract must be 5.1 - 0.3 = 4.8 > 4.75 = u. Only the firm is harmed;
the worker benefits.
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VI. Robustness

In this section we examine the robustness of our results to changes in
certain key assumptions and offer some further justification for them.
We have assumed a simple bargainingframework where the firm makes
a take-it-or-leave-it offer. If instead the worker makes the offer, he or
she will always capture all the potential joint value by demanding the
contract (AN, v). Under this contract the worker would receive all the
marginalproduct, and quit decisions would be on the basis of the worker's
lifetime marginal product from staying with the firm vis-A-vis that from
taking an outside offer. Joint value would always be maximized. Extending the model to include a constraint for the firm's participation
moves the results back into line with those where the firm makes the offer.
In particular, suppose that the joint-value-maximizing contract form is
never-quit and that the firm must earn at least nt > nt(AN, W(O))to cover
its fixed costs. The contract (AN, v) is joint-value maximizing but would
be unacceptable to the firm. If a mutually acceptable contract exists, it is
either an efficient no-notice contract or a contract resulting in excessively
low retention.
Return to the original bargaining framework, but now allow for lumpsum transfers. The firm could capture all of the potential surplus by in
effect selling the firm to the worker-offering the contract (AN, v),
always efficient by the corollary, in return for a lump-sum payment equal
to the maximum joint value net of the worker's reservation utility u. It
will always be rational for the firm to offer an advance-notice contract
that maximizes joint value. Therefore, departuresfrom joint-value maximization (with or without the mandate) vanish when lump-sum transfers
are permitted. Further, the notice mandate cannot be redistributive. The
mandate is completely emasculated. But as noted in the introduction,
such lump-sum payments from worker to firm, and similar forms of
posting bond, are rare.
Next, suppose the contract wage can depend on whether the firm is
permanent or temporary. Such contracts are described by the 3-tuple
(X, Wp, WT), where wp and WT are state-contingent wages. (By definition,
WP = WT under a no-notice contract.) Contingent-quit contracts become
less costly for the firm to implement. To deter quits in the permanent
state requires wp be at least equal to co in the permanent state. But WT
can be set below co if deterring quits in the temporary state is not a goal.
The cost of a never-quit contract is not changed by the freedom to make
wages contingent on the state of the firm. This is patently true when
the participation constraint binds. But it is also true if the participation
constraint is slack: the worker has to be made indifferent between quitting
and not quitting, regardless of the contractual notice provisions. Thus,
the worker must be guaranteed an expected utility of 2co:this is the cost
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to the firm. The contract (NN, W(p), W(p)) will meet this condition. So,
too, will the contract (AN, co, W(0)), where in contrast to the contingentquit discussion, the wage is now greater in the temporary state than in
the permanent state. Unlike the basic model, it follows that every nonotice contract-now including the never-quit variety-can be duplicated by an advance-notice contract through an appropriate choice of wp
and WT.
Since any no-notice contract can be duplicated by a contract (AN, wp,
WT) for appropriate choice of wp and WT, the effect of state-contingent
wage contracts is to emasculate a notice mandate. The firm can negotiate
around its effects. Lazear (1990) makes a similar point. But also like
Lazear we are skeptical of a model in which mandates have no real effects.
Our view is that transactions costs largely preclude complex, state-contingent contracts.9
VII. Empirical Predictions
What conditions-in
terms of the underlying parameters of the
model-make advance-notice contracts likely in equilibrium? Here we
provide a brief description of the model's empirical content.'0
It has been established that the parameter space can be partitioned into
three nonintersecting regions corresponding to whether the always-quit
contract (NN, 0), the contingent-quit contract (AN, co), or the neverquit contract (NN, W(p)) characterizes equilibrium. The firm will be
indifferent between the never-quit and the contingent-quit contract when
(1 + p)v-2o

+ (1--p)r(o = [2p + (1-p)(1-r)](v-&().

(3)

Note in particular that, independent of pAcondition (3) holds when r
= c/v. The firm is indifferent between the contingent-quit and the always-quit contract when
[2p + (1 -p)(1

-

r)](v-

o)

=

(1-r)(1

+ (1

-

r)p)v

(4)

Absenceof state-contingentwage contractsneed not be evidenceof conventionaltransactioncosts.In anenvironmentin whichthe partiesareasymmetrically
informedat the outset, the choice of contractby the informedparty has the
potentialto revealprivateinformation.Achievingsuch separationtypicallyrequirescontractswith state-contingentpayments.But, if the informationwill also
laterbe used to the informedparty'sdetriment,separatingcontingentcontracts
are unlikelyto occur.See Kuhn (1994)for an exampleof a model relatedto the
context of plantclosureand earlyquits.
'? We have shown that a tighterparticipationconstraintpushes the firm that
wouldotherwiseofferanalways-quitcontractin the directionof a contingent-quit
1 then always-quitcontractswill be the equilibrium
contract.Further,if o/v
arrangement.In what follows, therefore,it is assumedthat u = u(NN, 0) and
-

(0/v < 1.
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0
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FIG. 4.-Equilibrium

1

partition for (0/v = .75

and betweenthe never-quitand always-quitcontractswhen
(1 + p)v

-

2o + (1 -p)r(o = (1-

r)(1 + (1-

r)p)v.

(5)

All three conditionsof indifferenceare met simultaneouslyif and only
if p = .5 and r = 0/v. Both (4) and (5) imply an inverse relationship
between r and p. It can also be shown that at p < .5, the value of r
requiredto satisfy(4) is greaterthan that to satisfy(5), while the reverse
is true for p > .5. It is furtherhelpful to note that at (r, p) = (1, 0),
condition(4) is satisfied.
Figure4 illustratesthese relationshipsusing the value co/v = .75. The
threecontractsarethe never-quitcontractN, the contingent-quitcontract
C, and A, denoting the always-quitcontract.Along the locus NC the
firmis indifferentbetweennever-quitandcontingent-quitcontracts.The
loci CA and NA are similarlydefinedmnemonically.For eachlocus the
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first (second)letter refersto which of the two contractsis preferredin
the region above (below) the locus. In the intersectionof the regions
below CA and NA, the firmwill offer the always-quitcontract(NN, 0)
or its equivalent(AN, 0). In the region above CA and below NC, the
firm offers the contingent-quitcontract(AN, co).The equilibriumis the
never-quit contract (NN, W(p)) in the intersection of the regions above
NA and NC.
Using figure 4, the empirical predictions of the model become transparent. Consider the region p < .5. As is evident from the figure, under this
condition the firm will never offer the contingent-quit contract, the only
interesting advance-notice contract. In the area to the right of p = .5 there
emerges the wedge-shaped region bounded by CA and NC in which the
firm offers advance notice to achieve the contingent-quit arrangement.
For each value of p > .5, there is an interval of r values within which
the equilibrium is a contingent-quit advance-notice contract. The upper
bound of this interval is always r = 0o/v. The lower bound falls with an
increase in p. The lower the chance of plant closure, therefore, the more
likely is a contingent-quit advance-notice contract.
Finally, consider the effect of increasing the outside offer corelative to
the value of marginal product v. It is easily confirmed that when c0/v
1 the three indifference loci collapse to r = 1. This suggests that the
contingent-quit region would shrink monotonically with an increase in
0o/v. Using numerical methods, we established this is indeed the case.
To summarize, we would expect contingent-quit advance-notice contracts where a small to moderate probability of plant closure is combined
with a probability of an outside offer that is close to but below the ratio
of the outside wage to the value of marginal product. The latter condition
is least restrictive where the ratio of the outside wage to the value of
marginal product is small. If these conditions are not met, we would
expect to see no-notice arrangements, even if the cost of enforcing advance-notice contracts is low. This observation sharply differentiates our
model from competing theories.
-

VIII. Concluding Remarks
Summers (1989) makes the case that mandated benefits can be justified
if workers value the benefit they are receiving and are prepared to pay
its cost through lower wages. Of course, there must be a market failure
to explain the underprovision of the benefit in the first place; a common
example is adverse selection in health insurance. By extension, there is a
common perception that advance notice is also underprovided. As we
have seen, the theoretical literature on advance notice starts from this
perspective and finds a candidate for market failure in a commitment
problem on the part of firms. On Kuhn's (1992) analysis, if all parties
are at the outset equally uninformed of the firm's prospects, a notice
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mandate can benefit both the firm and the worker. The widespread opposition on the part of business in the debate leading up to WARN (the
Worker Adjustment Retraining and Notification Act, Public Law 100379) suggests to us the straightforward possibility that voluntary notice
may be feasible but is not necessarily sufficiently valued to justify its
provision.
Indeed, we have shown that no-notice contracts can circumvent a potential market failure. They serve the productive purpose of binding the
worker to the firm. There is a commitment problem, but it is on the part
of the worker not the firm. The firm faced with a binding notice mandate
will find in one of two alternatives the most profitable response, both of
which are in sharp contrast to the Summers parable. The first possibility
is to raise the wage so that the retention rate does not fall. The worker
obtains a valuable benefit and the wage is increased, but there is no change
in quits. The worker's gain is merely the firm's loss. The second alternative
is to lower the wage, which is feasible precisely because the advance
notice is valued. But this particular option exacerbates the true efficiency
problem, namely, excessive quits. The worker pays for a valued benefit,
yet at the same time a distortion is introduced by the form of payment.
On the basis of our analysis, then, the case for mandated notice must rest
on equity rather than efficiency grounds.
The overprovision of notice which we have identified can be interpreted
as a consequence of a market failure, a missing market for jobs. If the
firm could put a price on jobs via a lump-sum levy, the wage is freed to
serve the role of achieving separation efficiency, and the amount of notice
given will always be appropriate. All the surplus can be extracted by
selling the firm to the workers, giving them all their marginal product
along with full information. Of course, our basic result that a mandate
can be of no benefit still stands. But now a mandate can do no harm
either, since it places no constraint on the firm.
Appendix
The Participation Constraint
The results derived in the case u = u(AN, 0) also hold in the more
general formulation of the participation constraint. Consider the situation
illustrated in figure 2. In the figure, only contingent-quit contracts are
joint-value maximizing, but at u = u(AN, 0) the equilibrium contract is
nevertheless the always-quit contract (AN, 0) because t(AN, 0) > t(AN,
W(1)). This offers a rich set of possibilities illustrating the potential effects
of the participation constraint. First, if u c u(AN, 0), u is so small that
the participation constraint does not bind. Second, where u > u(AN, 0)
but u is sufficiently small, it will be the case that t(AN, w) > t(AN, co),
where w satisfies u = u(AN, w). The effect of the participation constraint
will be to increase the equilibrium contract wage but still leave it in the
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range where the worker always quits. However, there is a critical value
of w, call it w", where it(AN, w") = t(AN, W(t)) and w- < W(t). The
is u 2 u(AN,
and u < u(AN, W(t)): the effect
third case, then, wi)
of the constraint is to cause the firm to switch to a JVM (joint-valuemaximizing) contingent-quit contract. This is the situation illustrated in
figure 2, where the firm prefers allocation C to A'. Fourth, if r 2 u(AN,
W(t)) and u c J(AN, W(t)), the equilibrium contract will be a contingentquit contract, and the firm extracts all the surplus. Finally, if U > J(AN,
W(t)), there is no contract.
These results generalize to all cases:
PROPOSITIONAl. The only respect, if any, in which the equilibrium
contract does not maximize joint value is that there may be insufficient
retention. In all departures from joint-value maximization, the equilibrium contract is (or is equivalent to) an advance-notice contract. Tightening the participation constraint by increasing u reduces the incidence
of these contracts.
Proof. The possibilities can be partitioned into four cases. First, the
participation constraint is not binding. Second, the participation constraint is binding but is slack for all JVM contracts. Third, the participation constraint is binding but is satisfied by some, though not all, JVM
contracts. Fourth, the participation constraint is not satisfied by any JVM
contract.
In the first case, the worker's utility in the equilibrium without the
participation constraint is at least u. The participation constraint has no
effect on equilibrium. In the fourth case, the joint value of the match is
negative. No match should or will occur.
If the participation constraint in the firm's problem (2) is binding and
is violated for some JVM contracts-the third case-then the firm would
offer the least-cost JVM contract consistent with participation.
This leaves the second case in which the participation constraint is
binding in (2) but is slack for all JVM contracts. Absent the constraint,
the firm would offer a contract inducing an excessive rate of quits in
preference to the least-cost JVM contract, with the constraint that preference may be reversed. Because all JVM contracts satisfy the constraint,
it has no effect on the profitability of the JVM contract alternative. The
participation constraint is, however, binding, thereby reducing the
profitability of contracts that do not maximize joint value. Q.E.D.
Using p = 0.5, r = 0.4, co= 2, v = 3, and u values of 3.1, 3.4, and 3.7,
the interested reader can construct examples where the equilibrium is not
JVM, where the participation constraint is slack but plays a role in ensuring the equilibrium is JVM, and where the participation constraint binds.
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